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Wiggins v. Smith
123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003)
LFacts
Seventy-seven-year-old Florence Lacs ("Lacs") was found dead in the
bathtub of her ransacked apartment in Woodlawn, Maryland on September 17,
1988. Kevin Wiggins ("Wggins") was indicted on October 20, 1988 for the
drowning of Lacs and was charged, rtra//a, with first-degree murder. Wiggins
elected to be tried before a judge in Baltimore County Circuit Court and was
represented by two public defenders, Carl Schlaich ("Schlaich") and Michelle
Nethercott ("Nethercott"). On August 4, 1989, Wiggins was found guilty of
first-degree murder, robbery, and two counts of theft.1
After being convicted, Wiggins elected to be sentenced by a jury, and his
counsel filed a motion for bifurcation of sentencing.2 Defense counsel sought
to bifurcate the sentencing proceedings to present evidence that Wiggins was not
the principal and evidence in mitigation separately so as not to dilute either
presentation? The court denied the motion for bifurcation and the sentencing
proceedings began soon thereafter.' On October 18, 1989, the jury sentenced
Wiggins to death and a divided Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion and sentence.'
A. StaePbm ctimcn omix
With newcounsel, Wiggins sought postconviction relief fromthe Baltimore
County Circuit Court in 1993, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at sen-
tencing in violation of the Sixth Amendment.' Wiggins claimed that the public
defenders had rendered constitutionally defective assistance bynot investigatmng
and presenting mitigation evidence concerning his "dysfunctional background."
Wiggins presented testimonybya licensed social worker, Hans Selvog (Selvog"),
1. Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527,2531-32 (2003) [hereinafter Wg m II].
2. Id at 2532.
3. Id
4. Id
5. Id; see Wiggins v. State, 597 A.2d 1359, 1374 (d. 1991) (affirming the trial court's
conviction and sentence), w dae 503 U.S. 1007 (1992).
6. Wrias III, 123 S. C. at 2532,2534; seeUS. COMT. amend. VI (stating in pertinent part
that [in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence").
7. Wzn III, 123 S. Ct. at 2532.
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whom the court certified as an expert! Selvog had compiled a detailed social
history report concerning the physical and sexual abuse Wiggins had endured as
a child and young adult and testified to the contents of his report.9
Scblaich testified during the postconviction proceedings that he could not
remember requesting a social history report even though funds were available
from the public defender's office for this purpose." According to Schlaich, he
and Nethercott had decided prior to trial to focus their strategy on contesting
Wiggins's actual responsibility for the murder.1 The trial judge noted "that he
could not remember a capital case in which counsel had not compiled a social
history of the defendant, explaining, 'In]ot to do a social history, at least to see
what you have got, to me is absolute error."" 2 Despite its reservations, the court
denied Wiggins's petition for postconviction relief and stated that" 'when the
decision not to investigate ... is a matter of trial tactics, there is no ineffective
assistance of counsel.' "13 The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's denial of relief and held that counsel's decision to focus on Wiggins's
actual guilt was a tactical decision and that trial counsel" 'made a reasoned choice
to proceed with what they thought was their best defense 14
B. Federd Habws P
In September 2001 Wiggins filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the writ."
The court cited Vd/iarrs v TalW6 and held that the Maryland courts' denial of
Wiggins's ineffective assistance of counsel claim" 'involved an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law.'"' 7 The district court held that in
8. Id
9. Id at 2532-33. According to Selvog's report, W'iggins had been physically abused byhis
mother and sexually abused during his stays with a series of foster parents. Id at 2533.
10. Id at 2533. Defense counsel possessed both a presentence investigation (PSI") report
and the Department of Social Services ("DSS") records prior to the sentencing proceedings. Id
Each report gave a partial account of Wiggins's background and circumstances, but defense counsel
did not request a social history report. Id
11. Id
12. Id
13. W nz 111, 123 S. Cc. at 2533 (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
14. Id at 2533-34 (quoting Wiggins v. State, 724 A.2d 1, 17 (Md. 1999)).
15. Id at 2534; se Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538,547 (. Md. 2001) [hereinafter
W in1/ (vacating Wiggins's conviction). Seegea/ny 28 U.S.C 5 2254 (2000) (stating that a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to a state court decision can only be granted if the state court decision
was contrary to or an unreasonable application of dearly established federal law, part of AEDPA).
16. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
17. Wi III, 123 S. Ct. at 2534 (quoting Wrgi I, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 557); see 28 U.S.C
2254(d)(1) (allowing the issuance of a writ of certiorari if the lower court's decision "involved an
unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished Federal law"; part of AEDPA); Williams v. Taylor,
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order for defense counsel's "strategic decision to be reasonable, it must be 'based
upon information the attorneyhas made after conducting a reasonable investiga-
tion. "'8 The court found that trial counsel's decision not to investigate further
was unreasonable based on the evidence they had and concluded that "their
knowledge triggered an obligation to look further" into Wiggins's background
and life history.'9 The district court vacated Wiggins's conviction and sentence
and ordered that Wiggins be released unless the State appealed the ruling, which
it did.20 The Fourth Crcuit reversed the district court's decision and held that
Schlaich's and Nethercott's decision to focus on Wiggins's direct responsibility
was "a reasonable strategic decision" in light of the fact that they"knew at least
some details of Wiggins' childhood from the PSI and social services records."21
The court agreed with the Maryland Court of Appeals that the information
obtained bySchlaich and Nethercott was sufficient to make an informed choice
of strategy.22 Wggins petitioned the United States Supreme Court and the Court
granted certiorari. '
I. Hddiig
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Grcuit's decision and remanded
the case for further proceedings.24 The Court held that the Maryland Court of
Appeals unreasonablyapplied the applicable legal principle as set forth in Stri&-
land v Washrvod s for determining Sixth Amendment effective assistance of
counsel.26 The Court applied the two-pronged test from Stri&/azdand held that
529 U.S. 362, 395-99 (2000) (holding that defense counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence
at the sentencing hearing constituted ineffective assistance).
18. Wzrim 111, 123 S. CL at 2534 (quoting Wiim I, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 558).
19. Id
20. Wt ii 1, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
21. Wl , III, 123 S. C. at 2534; see Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 641 (4th Cr. 2002)
[hereinafter Wtims I/] (stating that tactical decision by defense counsel to focus on Wiggins's guilt
was reasonable). For a complete discussion and analysis of W'ztu II, see generally Kristen F.
Grunewald, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 221 (2002) (analyzing Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629
(4th Cir. 2002) and Hunt v. Lee, 291 F.3d 284 (4th Cr. 2002)).
22. ftizm II, 288 F.3d at 637.
23. iam II, 123 S. Ct. at 2534; seWiggins v. Corcoran, 537 U.S. 1027, 1027 (2002) (mee.)
(granting certiorar).
24. ftbm III, 123 S. Ct. at 2544.
25. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
26. t irz III, 123 S. Ct. at 2538; s,28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (mandating that a writ of
habeas corpus shall not issue unless the lower court proceedings "resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined bythe Supreme Court of the United States"; part of AEDPA); Strickland v. Washion, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (creating two-pronged test for addressing ineffective assistance of counsel
claims); W&=lim, 529 US. at 413 (holding that writ of habeas corpus may be granted if "the state
court identifies the correct governing legal principle .. .but unreasonably applies that principle to
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the decision of Schlaich and Nethercott not to expand their investigation of
Wiggins's history for mitigating evidence beyond the PSI and DSS evidence fell
short of prevailing professional norms and that the inadequate investigation
prejudiced W'ggins's defense."' Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dis-
sented.28
Under S 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the
state court proceedings "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States."2 9 In applying this standard, the Su-
preme Court determined in Wdiam "that the 'unreasonable application' prong
of S 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court
identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court' decisions but
unreasonablyapplies that principle to the facts' of petitioner's case."3" The Court
has further held in applying S 2254(d)(1) that the state court's application of the
governing legal principle must be "objectivelyunreasonable" and not just incor-
rect or erroneous.'
The Court first identified Sti&/lavr as the clearly established federal law to
apply when determining ineffective assistance of counsel.3 2 Under Stridear, an
applicant must prove that defense counsel's performance was constitutionally
deficient and that counsel's errors prejudiced the defense.33 The Court found
that Widim was "illustrative of the proper application of" Strick/aL 31 WZia
also involved a claim that defense counsel failed to conduct a proper investiga-
the facts"); swa1soBell v. Cone, 535 US. 685,694 (2002) ("The focus of the [unreasonable applica-
tion] inquiry is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objec-
tivelyunreasonable....").
27. Wim III, 123 S. C. at 2542-44; see Strikla4 466 US. at 687 (holding that to prove
ineffective assistance of counsel an applicant must show deficient performance of counsel and that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to prevent a fair tria).
28. Wor III, 123 S. C. at 2544 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1).
30. Win III, 123 S. Ca. at 2534-35 (quoting W'idiam, 529 U.S. at 413).
31. W1 inr HI, 123 S. Cc. at 2535 (quoting Widliam, 529 U.S. at 409); see Locker v. Andrade,
123 S. Cc. 1166, 1175 (2003) (citing Wdliam for the proposition that application of precedent must
be "objectivelyunreasonable'); Bd/, 535 US. at 699 (same); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,27
(2002) (per curiam) (same).
32. W' s III, 123 S. Ct. at 2535.
33. Id at 2535; see Striddaz 466 U.S. at 687 (establishing two-pronged test for ineffective
assistance of counsel).
34. Wfta III, 123 S. CL at 2535; see Widliam, 529 U.S. at 396 (stating that counsel's limited
investigation could not be justified as a tactical decision).
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tion of mitigating evidence.3" The Wdliam Court concluded that this failure
could not be justified as a tactical decision and that failure to investigate further
was unreasonable. 6 The Win Court also noted that, although its decision in
Wiifian had not yet been decided when the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled on
Wiggins's case, no newlaw was created in Wdlian. Rather, the Wliam decision
was " 'squarely governed'" by the Court's decision in Stridkamr therefore, the
federal law the state court should have applied was clearly establishedY
A. Applodw qStrickland
1. Pe77w xPag
Counsel's performance must fall "below'an objective standard of reasonable-
ness'" to be categorized as deficient under the first element of Stride/lrL38 The
Court established that" [t]he proper measure of attomeyperformance remains
simplyreasonableness under prevailing professional norms."'"9 Wiggins claimed
that his trial counsel's failure to expand the scope of their investigation of
potential mitigating evidence amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.'
Schlaich and Nethercott defended their decision to stop the investigation by
stating that theymade a tactical decision to focus on an alternate strategythat did
not depend on mitigating evidence.4 The Court pointed out that the strategic
judgments of counsel are " 'virtually unchallengeable.' "42 As in Wiam, the
Court found that the question was not whether the choice of strategy was
reasonable, but whether the investigation of Wiggins's background, or lack
thereof, "u s its4fmn e using prevailing professional norms as a guide."'
The Court found that Schlaich's and Nethercott's decision not to further
their mitigation investigation fell short of Maryland's professional standards in
1989." The Court pointed to Schlaich's acknowledgment that standard practice
in Maryland at the time included acquiring a social historyreport and that defense
counsel did not obtain one, even with money available from the Public
35. W m III, 123 S. C. at 2535 (citing W'dliam, 529 US. at 396).
36. Id
37. Id at 2535-36 (quoting William, 529 US. at 390). This determination was for the benefit
of the dissent, which suggested that Willina did not qualify as "clearly established Federal law, as
determined bythe Supreme Court of the United States." Id at 2546 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (quoting
28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000)).
38. Id at 2535 (quoting Stri&Lvar 466 US. at 688).
39. Id (quoting Stiklant 466 U.S. at 688) (alteration in original).
40. Id at 2535.
41. Wims III, 123 S. C. at 2535.
42. Id (quoting Srikkarm 466 U.S. at 690).
43. Id; se W'dlimn, 529 US. at 415 (concluding that defense counsel has a duty to conduct
a thorough investigation into a client's background).
44. Wigos 11, 123 S. Q. at 2536.
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Defender's office.45 The Court also pointed out that Schlaich's and Nethercott's
performance "similarly fell short of the standards for capital defense work
articulated bythe American Bar Association (ABA)- standards to which we long
have referred as 'guides to determining what is reasonable.' "' The Court noted
that the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases recommend that defense counsel should en-
deavor to gather all reasonablyavailable mitigating evidence.47 The Court found
that Schlaich and Nethercott did not meet this standard and stopped the investi-
gation with "only rudimentary knowledge" of Wiggins's background gathered
"from a narrow set of sources."48
The Court also found that the scope of Schlaich's and Nethercott's investi-
gation was limited unreasonably in light of the evidence present in the DSS
records.49 Agreeing with the district court, the Court found that the absence of
any aggravating factors in Wiggins's background and the long list of mitigating
factors in the DSS record would have caused anyreasonablycompetent attorney
to pursue the leads in the record to make an informed choice concerning strat-
egy.0 The Court further found that Schlaich and Nethercott did not discover
evidence that indicated that further investigation would be counterproductive and
distinguished this case from Supreme Court precedent that upheld limited
investigations because of their counterproductivity, In fact, the Court noted
that further investigation would have revealed the sexual abuse later found in the
post-conviction proceedings.52
The Court also found the record of the sentencing proceedings to be
indicative of Schlaich's and Nethercott's inattention and not their "reasoned
45. Id
46. Id at 2537 (quoting Stri&/Az 466 US. at 688); se The American Bar Association
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases S
11.4. 1(q (1989) [hereinafter"ABAGuidelines forDeath PenakyDefense"] (detailing the minimum
requirements for the appointment and performance of counsel for death penalty defense).
47. Wi~zis III, 123 S. Ct. at 2537; sm ABA Guidelines for Death PenalyDefense, supra note
46, at 11.4.1(Q (providing that investigations into mitigating evidence "should comprise efforts
to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence").
48. Wi,&r- Ii, 123 S. Ca. at 2537.
49. Id
50. Id (citing W'gim 1, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 559).
51. Id; see, eg, Stri&lar 466 U.S. at 699 (finding that limited investigation was reasonable
because counsel could mae a strategic choice that further evidence would not be helpful); Burger
v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-95 (1987) (finding that limited investigation was reasonable because
much of the evidence found was harmful);Dardenv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,186 (1986) (finding
limited invest ation reasonable because of damaging testimony that would have been presented if
mitigating evidence was used).
52. Wigim HI, 123 S. Ca at 2537.
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strategic judgment." Schaich and Nethercott persisted in their desire for
bifurcation of the sentencing proceedings until the daybefore sentencing.5 4 The
Court concluded from this that defense counsel had every reason to continue
preparing a mitigation case until the court denied the bifurcation motion.5
The Court found further support for its conclusion that defense counsel's
conduct was unreasonable in the fact that counsel did not focus exclusively on
Wiggins's direct responsibility for the murder during the sentencing proceed-
ings. 6 In her opening statement, Nethercott suggested that the jury was going
to hear about Wiggins's "difficult life."" Yet, defense counsel never presented
mitigating evidence about Wiggins's life history" They presented evidence in
mitigation, however, that was not related to Wiggins's life history or his direct
responsibility for the murder, which indicated to the Court that defense counsel
presented a "half hearted" mitigation case that could only be justified as a
"tactical choice" by post-hoc rationalization. 9
In holding that the Maryland Court of Appeals unreasonably applied
StrickLar the Court noted that "a court must consider not onlythe quantum of
evidence alreadyknown to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would
lead a reasonable attomeyto investigate further."' The Court stated that Sti&-
land did not establish that an investigation of any scope justifies a strategic
decision.61 Instead, a habeas court must consider the reasonableness of the
investigation used to support the chosen strategy.62 The Maryland Court of
Appeals recognized that defense counsel's failure to request a social history did
not meet minimum standards, but the court failed to assess whether the decision
to confine the mitigating evidence investigation to the PSI and DSS records
"demonstrated reasonable professional judgement." 63 The Court found that in
light of the PSI and DSS records, defense counsel "abandonfed] their investiga-
tion at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision with respect
53. Id
54. Id
55. Id at 2538. The Court also factored in Schlaich's and Nethercott's representation that
they were prepared to present mitigating evidence in reaching its conclusion. Id
56. Id
57. Id
58. Wft4, 111, 123 S. Ct. at 2538.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id The Court also limited the reach of its decision by stating "that Stri&ad does not
require counsel to investigate everyconceivable line of mitigating evidence .... Nor does Stride ai
require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case.... Both
conclusions would interfere with the 'constitutionally protected independence of counsel' at the
heart of Stri*&lam" Id at 2541 (quoting St-,tkl/nd 466 U.S. at 689).
62. Id at 2538.
63. Id
2003]
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to sentencing strategy impossible."' Thus, the Court held that the Maryland
court's assumption of adequacy was an objectively unreasonable application of
Striz&/am 65 The Court concluded that" 'strategic choices made after less than
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.'
2. TheudiazJAu
The Court proceeded to the second prong of Sti&ld and reviewed de
novo whether the inadequate performance prejudiced Wiggins's defense. 7 To
establish prejudice, an applicant" 'must showthat there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probabilityis a probabilitysufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. "'6 The Court stated that the failure to
present the "powerful" mitigation case concerning Wiggins's past prejudiced the
defense.69  The Court concluded that the jury only heard one mitigating
factor- that Wiggins had no prior convictions of any type- and that if con-
fronted with the evidence of Wiggins's past, there was a reasonable probability
that a jury could have delivered a different result.7'
B. 7Te Scalia Dissor
Justice Scalia first attacked the majority's contention that Wliam qualified
under S 2254(d)(1) as "dearly established federal law."71 Scalia argued that
W'dlia was not clearly established " 'as q'd* tih e thEq e e tumi state-m deasio'
"72 The majority rejected this contention, stating that because Wdiiam was only
64. W'trm ti1, 123 S. ct. at 2538.
65. Id; s28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (providing forthe issuance of awrit of habeas corpus
if lower court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent; part of AEDPA).
66. Wzgis II1, 123 S. CL at 2539 (quoting Svitra n 466 US. at 690-91). The Court also
noted that the Maryland Court of Appeals made" 'an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented'" when it cited Wiggins's sexual abuse as part of the PSI and DSS
records; the Court only found Wiggins's sexual abuse history in Selvog's report. Id; 28 U.S.C S
2254(d)(2).
67. Wi Em III, 123 S. . at 2542.
68. Id (quoting Stn /Lar 466 US. at 694).
69. Id at 2543.
70. Id
71. Id at 2546 (Scalia,J., dissenting); sw28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1) (providing for issuance of writ
of habeas corpus if lower court unreasonably applies dearly established federal law as determined
by the Supreme Coun4 part of AEDPA).
72. Wion II, 123 S. Ct. at 2546 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting WMiarr, 529 U.S. at 412)
(emphasis in Wzgvz II).
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before the Court on habeas review and not direct appeal, the governing law was
the Stri&/Ld precedent that had been dearly established since 1984."3
Next, Scalia disagreed with the majority's lack of deference to the Maryland
Court of Appeals's factual determination that Schlaich and Nethercott made a
permissible tactical decision. 4 Justice Scalia argued that the majority's
conclusion- that the lower court's Strickland application was
unreasonable- rested on a "fundamental fallacy.""5 According to Justice Scalia,
the majority's error was in asserting "that the state court 'clearly assumed that
counsel's investigation began and ended with the PSI report and DSS records.'
"76 Justice Scalia found nothing in the Maryland court's decision that indicated
that this was its conclusion; in fact, he found that the state court record indicated
clearlythat defense counsel had looked beyond the PSI report and DSS records. 7
Justice Scalia also pointed out that Schlaich had testified that he knew informa-
tion about Wiggins's background which was not in the PSI report and DSS
records."8 Justice Scalia argued that the state court's determination that defense
counsel had adequatelyinvestigated Wiggins's background was reasonable under
§ 2254(d)(1). 79 The majoritydisagreed, finding that the record provided evidence
that the state court believed that defense counsel did not look beyond the two
pieces of evidence they possessed.0
Finally, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority's conclusion that Wiggins
was prejudiced by his attorneys' conduct."' Justice Scalia found no "reasonable
probability that a social history report would have altered the strategy of
Wiggins's counsel. 2 Because Justice Scalia found that defense counsel was aware
of Wiggins's background and found that the decision to limit the investigation
was a strategic choice, he found no reason to believe that defense counsel would
have chosen a different strategy based on a social history report." Justice Scalia
also concluded that Selvog's report would have been inadmissible at trial and
sentencing anyway."' He based this conclusion on the fact that the report
contained "hearsaystatements" and Maryland law requires that only reliable
73. Id at 2535-36.
74. Id at 2547 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id
76. Id (quoting the majority opinion).
77. Id
78. W' girz I, 123 S. C. at 2547 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Id; se28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000) (requiring that writ of habeas corpus issue only if
lower court application of federal law was unreasonable; part of AEDPA).
80. W';i2 1, 123 S. Q. at 2538-39.
81. Id at 2551 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Id
83. Id at 2551-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id at 2552 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2003]
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evidence be admitted at sentencing. 5 Justice Scalia, admitting for the sake of
argument that Selvog's report would have been admissible, concluded that there
was no "reasonable probability" that a jury would have believed Wiggins's
statements concerning his history and sentenced him to life as a result.86
IV. Appiaitio Mn Vnzia
In W froniv Viscaa the Court attempted to resolve the proper applica-
tion of the AEDPA term "objectively unreasonable" to state court decisions
regarding the Strkl/arI standard." The Court's decision in Wiim, however, is
analytically closer to its decision in Wlias."9 In Wdiars, the Court found fault
with the Supreme Court of Virginia's interpretation of Striakr it found that the
Virginia court's novel interpretation of the performance prong and that court's
"obvious failure to consider the totality of the omitted mitigation evidence" in
applying the prejudice prong was objectively unreasonable.' The Court, how-
ever, did not define what the objectively reasonable standard actually was. In
Wcfbx the Court overturned a Ninth Curcuit decision that found that a Califor-
nia state court unreasonably applied the Supreme Court's standard as defined in
Stridea'rz- 9 The Court noted that an" 'urmvscnb/e application of federal law is
different from an imn application of federal law' " and that "[t]he Ninth
Circuit did not observe this distinction, but ultimately substituted its own judg-
ment for that of the state court, in contravention of 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)."12
Woaofbo stands for the proposition that great deference should be granted to
state court decisions when reviewed under S 2254(d)(1) unless the lower court's
decision was "objectively unreasonable."93 That term, as applied in Wcrafonj
85. Id; see Whittleseyv. State, 665 A.2d 223, 243 (Md. 1995) (holding that for evidence to be
admissible at capital sentencing it must be reliable, but formal rules of evidence do not apply).
86. W&z III, 123 S. Ct. at 2553-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. 537 US. 19 (2002).
88. See Wbaf* 537 U.S. at 27 (finding that federal courts mayissue a writ of habeas corpus
under S 2254(d)(1) onlywhen the lowercourt decision was "objectivelyunreasonable"). "OWnder
§2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent judgment,
the state-court decision applied Stoi&Ldincorrectly.'" Id (quoting Bd4 535 US. at 699). "The
federal habeas scheme leaves primary responsibility with the state courts for these judgments, and
authorizes federal-court intervention onlywben a state-court decision is objectively unreasonable."
Id For a complete discussion and analysis of Wcxxfr see generally Philip H Yoon, Case Note,
15 CAP.DEF.J. 427 (2003) (analyzing Woodford v. Visciotti, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002)).
89. See Willirr, 529 US. at 409,416 (finding that the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision
not to consider the totality of the mitigating evidence was "objectively unreasonable").
90. Id at 414-16.
91. W ono,4 537 U.S. at 27.
92. Id at 25 (quoting Williamr, 529 U.S. at 410).
93. See id at 27 (holding that the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the holding in Widliam when
it overturned a state court decision because it was incorrect and stating that incorrect or erroneous
[Vol. 16:1
WIGGINS V. SMITH
appeared to mean "virtually incomprehensible."94  Wi *, read with Wlianm,
appears to limit that deference. While the Court still did not define what "objec-
tively unreasonable" exactly is, the Court reaffirmed that defense trial counsel
cannot depend on the deference granted to state court decisions if their conduct
does not conform with" 'prevailing professional norms!'""'
It also appears from the Court's decision that the ability of counsel to rely
on a tactical decision to justify an inadequate mitigation investigation under
Stri&land is not absolute.' The Court signaled that a reviewing court's accep-
tance of a tactical decision at trial will not automatically be given deference."
The Court established that a reviewing court first must apply the appropriate
standard to determine whether defense counsel's assistance was ineffective,98 If
the assistance rendered was ineffective, then the reviewing court must determine
under § 2254 whether the lower court's determination of defense counsel's
actions was objectively unreasonable." The Fourth Circuit did not follow this
formula; instead, the court deferred to the judgment of the Maryland Court of
Appeals that defense counsel's actions were reasonable."° Such deference to a
lower court's assumptions of defense counsel's reasonableness will no longer be
acceptable under Wt='m. 10
Win arguablymakes the appointment of a mitigation specialist mandatory
in all capital cases.' The Court found that the professional standard in Mary-
land was to retain a mitigation specialist. 3 In addition, the ABA Guidelines for
Death PenaltyDefense recommend a defense team that includes two attorneys,
a fact investigator, and a mitigation specialist in all capital cases."° Virginia
decisions are not necessarily "objectively unreasonable").
94. Yoon, s"0m note 88, at 431-32 (analyzing Wbomnand finding that the Court is implying
that "unreasonable" means "incomprehensible").
95. W'g* III, 123 S. 0. at 2535-36 (quoting SidzLa, 466 U.S. at 688).
96. Id at 2538.
97. Id
98. Id at 2538-39.
99. Id at 2534-35.
100. Id at 2534 (citing Wg II, 288 F.3d at 639-42).
101. Wizn 111, 123 S. O. at 2538.
102. See mwdly Daniel L Payne, A MitizfmSpaiakStas a Neo4sitara Mattw cRi& 16
CAP. DEF.J. 43 (2003).
103. W;iWb I, 123 S. C. at 2536-37. The W'Ebs IX court highlighted the importance of
mitigation evidence at capital sentencing proceedings "because of the belief, long held by this
society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged back-
ground ... may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse." Id at 2542 (quoting
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302, 319 (1989)).
104. SeeThe American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases S 4.1(A)(1) (rev. ed. 2003) (requiring the appointment of
.no fewer than two attorneys ... an investigator, and a mitigation specialist").
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Capital Defender Units ("CDUs") will soon have full coverage of the Common-
wealth, and each CDU assigns a defense team as mandated bythe ABA Guide-
lines for Death PenakyDefense, including a mitigation specialist, to everycapital
case it handles.1 0 s The existence of CDUs throughout Virginia combined with
W" in creates two constitutional issues. First, under Wigns, if a capital defen-
dant is not given the benefit of a mitigation specialist to aid the defense in
gathering all reasonably available evidence, contrary to the standards published
by the ABA Guidelines for Death Penalty Defense and the Virginia standard
established bythe CDUs, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance
of counsel is violated. 6 Second, a matter of equal protection is raised for those
defendants appointed counsel external to the CDUs.'07 Those attorneys will be
forced to move for a mitigation specialist in open court. As a result, defendants
with representation external to the CDUs are disadvantaged when compared to
defendants represented by a CDU. Defense counsel should file a motion for a
mitigation specialist based on Wgtn and equal protection grounds."' 8
In Virginia it is especiallyimportant to investigate thoroughlya defendant's
background for mitigating evidence because the sentencing proceeding typically
occurs immediately after the capital conviction. Therefore, defense counsel
should prepare for the presentation of mitigating evidence well in advance of the
sentencing proceedings because time can become a limiting factor after a verdict
and before evidence is presented to the sentencing jury. Defense counsel should
move for the appointment of a mitigation specialist at the earliest possible
opportunity.
V. Ccz n
Wgin and Wihiazm make it clear that a decision not to present mitigating
evidence based on a limited investigation will not pass constitutional muster.
Defense counsel must make every effort, and use every tool at her disposal, to
investigate mitigating evidence. The failure to do so amounts to ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Terrence T. Egland
105. Telephone Interviewwith Steven Malar-Milani, Director, Virginia Capital Defender Unit,
Southwest Region (Nov. 14, 2003).
106. See W'&,, 111, 123 S. Ca. at 2536-37 (finding that Wiggins's counsel's performance was
ineffective because it fell below Maryland standards and, similarly, the ABA Guidelines).
107. Se Payne, s"nz note 102, at 59-60 (arguing that the Sixth Amendment requires the
appointment of a mitigation specialist in capital cases).
108. Contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse at (540) 458-8557 for a motion request-
ing the appointment of a mitigation specialist.
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